Contested Models of Democratic Virtues: Towards Global Norms for Universal Citizenship? by Souillac Geneviève & Genevieve Souillac
5I would like to begin this article by evoking eminent American and former 
President Woodrow Wilson’s words during the formation of the League of 
Nations. Wilson referred to world peace as “the democratic relationship of 
states”. I will expand on this idea by suggesting that peace also depends on the 
democratic relationship between individuals, or citizens, within an egalitarian 
and free society. This article is theoretical: it explores the connection between 
the principles of democratic governance, and those of global governance, within 
the broader framework of ethical or normative universalism, from the point 
of view of contemporary theories of democracy, citizenship and globalisation. 
I identify three models of democratic citizenship and their associated 
understandings of democratic virtues, civil society, and pluralism. These 
are (1) cosmopolitan citizenship, (2) discursive citizenship, and (3) regional 
citizenship. The cosmopolitan model of citizenship assumes the possibility of an 
international ethical society, composed of both states and a global civil society. 
The discursive model of citizenship presupposes a civil society which refl ects 
decision-making and policy-making procedures based on public dialogue and 
moral deliberation – what the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas calls 
“communicational ethics”. The regional model of citizenship expresses the 
virtue of collective responsibility through the quest for consensus on certain 
legal, political and ethical norms, such as the ones contained in international 
human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law. 
These three models of citizenship, democratic virtues and civil society provide 
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an excellent resource to formulate a model of universal citizenship based on a 
human-centered approach to political belonging and participation. In this article, 
I further suggest that a normative, universal model of citizenship which fi nds 
its roots in democratic wisdom can make a signifi cant contribution to the fi eld 
of peace and confl ict studies. Contemporary democratic theories of citizenship 
such as the ones discussed here may further elucidate the potential connections 
between the practice of citizenship, and peace-building and confl ict resolution.
1. Cosmopolitan citizenship
Andrew Linklater’s approach to cosmopolitan citizenship provides a useful 
starting point. As Linklater comments, cosmopolitan virtues originate from 
the two main Western democratic traditions, namely the republican tradition 
emphasizing solidarity and unity, and the liberal tradition accentuating diversity 
and individualism.(1) In an attempt to provide a synthesis of these two traditions, 
Linklater defi nes democratic citizenship as “the right of political participation, 
duties to other citizens and the responsibility for the welfare of the community as 
a whole.”(2) Linklater thus chooses to include the idea that responsibility for the 
welfare of the community as a whole constitutes a primary democratic virtue, in 
addition to the rights of political participation. With the aim of global peace, this 
defi nition can be extended to cosmopolitan citizenship, as a descriptive account 
of international belonging, which contains a prescriptive ethical dimension in 
its universal claims. In its contemporary form, the cosmopolitan concept of 
citizenship structures political, social and moral identity around the idea of 
universal belonging, or belonging to humanity.
Kant fi rst formulated the idea that republican citizenship combines the 
universal norms of equality, the rule of law, and the freedom of all, and is an 
integral component of world peace, in his 1795 essay Towards Perpetual Peace. 
In this essay, he says of the Republican constitution, that it “is established, 
fi rstly, by principles of the freedom of the members of a society  (as persons) 
secondly, by principles of the dependence of all upon a single common 
legislation (as subjects) and, thirdly, by the law of their equality (as citizens).”(3) 
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This original defi nition of cosmopolitan citizenship has broadened to include 
competing liberal and republican accounts of rights-based, versus virtue-
based, participatory approaches to citizenship. While the liberal approach to 
cosmopolitanism emphasizes the importance of human rights and global norms, 
the virtuous approach to cosmopolitan citizenship takes this claim even further, 
arguing that the international society is an “ethical” one only when the needs of 
global justice are met through the vigilance and engagement of individuals in 
civil society. In this framework, the virtues of solidarity and compassion hold an 
important place. Indeed republican cosmopolitan altruism suggests that citizens 
of one country may take upon themselves the burden of addressing issues that 
do not directly concern them. This notion of cosmopolitan altruism, informed by 
republican ideas of civic virtue and participation, is at the basis of a global civil 
society constituted of transnational networks of solidarity and activism.(4) 
In both liberal and republican versions of cosmopolitanism, the following 
idea has clearly emerged with regard to the international society: cosmopolitan 
citizenship requires that citizens of one country overcome their local attachments 
to embrace universal moral values, even if the former clash with the latter. 
Correspondingly, cosmopolitan notions of global civil society typically assume 
transnational relationships of solidarity. These are structured around interest 
movements articulating goals of political, social and economic justice through 
the rules of international law. They are effectively extended beyond the nation 
state to an international framework of cooperation between citizens of different 
countries, and beyond traditional loyalties to national and cultural belonging. As 
Richard Falk suggests, cosmopolitan consciousness spontaneously arises from a 
transnational militant activism motivated by the awareness of the global realities 
of injustice and inequity. Falk further argues that today, transnational citizenship 
operates in the context of a globalized but still politicized world characterized 
by “benefi ciaries and victims, inclusion and exclusion.”(5) Falk would thus like 
to see in cosmopolitan citizenship and transnational activism an instrument of 
contestation as a democratic virtue, since cosmopolitan citizenship is “in its 
essence, an expression of the spirit of ‘democracy without frontiers’.”(6)
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At the time when Kant was writing Perpetual Peace, the primary concern 
of theoreticians was to formulate the collective shift in political consciousness 
heralded from events such as the French Revolution. In this context, citizenship 
expressed a new normative framework for individuals and their participation 
in political society. From being unequal subjects of the sovereign to being 
republican citizens equal before the law marked an important transition towards 
the simultaneous experience of rights and responsibility.(7) Today’s transition 
is comparable in that democratic citizens of national states are now required 
to assume a new civic, and, arguably, democratic status in a globalized world 
regulated by international norms and global governance. This should in turn 
be accompanied by a renewed emphasis on the practice and responsibility of 
citizens in the ongoing construction of a normative society based on human 
rights and human security. An inclusive defence of cosmopolitanism such as 
the one proposed by Andrew Linklater integrates both republican and liberal 
components of citizenship but remains constructivist in essence. As Linklater has 
argued elsewhere, cosmopolitanism is both founded on, and further develops, 
“the recognition of an universal moral dimension.”(8) I would further argue for 
a pedagogic approach to citizenship, and suggest, as French historian Marcel 
Gauchet has shown with regard to the construction of the citizen at the time of 
the French Revolution, that such development calls for the “moral development” 
of the political subject.(9) 
One of the main contributions of the cosmopolitan notion of civil society 
and citizenship is that it challenges notions of nationalist loyalty, and reconnects 
democracy with normative solidarity on issues of human security and human 
rights. By embracing the interests of distant others, a peaceful consciousness 
of a global community is created which also meets the requirements of social 
justice. This in turn acknowledges the importance of the need to address 
structural violence, such as poverty and inequality, and it emphasizes that the 
role of citizens is to hold their governments accountable in the fulfi llment of this 
requirement, and makes democratic cosmopolitanism an essential component of 
a model of universal citizenship for peace. An alternative cognitive experience 
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of civic subjectivity, which includes the active loyalty to abstract moral ideas, 
can thus become in itself a form of normative civic identity. When citizenship 
is structured around ethical norms such as the pursuit of equity, human security 
and well-being, it questions the idea that the connection between democracy 
and nationalism and/or patriotism is self-evident. In this way, the cosmopolitan 
model of citizenship can become a model of active engagement with normative 
learning which complements cosmopolitanism’s implicit requirement to 
overcome national and cultural attachment. In favoring a new kind of experience 
of universal moral belonging, cosmopolitan citizenship can become a vital 
component of a concept of universal citizenship for an ethical community which 
not only prioritizes peaceful norms, but also provides an attractive alternative to 
substantial attachments such as those to nationalist and/or patriotic values.
II. Discursive citizenship
One of the main challenges directed at cosmopolitanism comes from 
the communitarian critique of liberalism. This critique suggests that it is 
“asking too much” of citizens to relinquish their local cultural attachments in 
favor of cosmopolitan norms and values.(10) As I have just argued however, a 
cosmopolitan view of citizenship need not be based on such a sacrifi cial view 
of identity. The discursive approach to democratic ethics can further contribute 
to an account of normative citizenship which emphasizes its role in peace-
building and relativizes claims around identity. The discursive approach’s main 
contribution to the debate on cosmopolitanism lies in its timely discussion of 
pluralism. The liberal perspective on pluralism traditionally associated with 
democratic norms of governance articulates ethical relationships based on 
tolerance for equal rights and diversity. However, as I will argue, it is only when 
the inherently political nature of diversity and inequity is acknowledged that 
the notion of a cosmopolitan democratic engagement which respects difference 
while at the same time seeking commonality and reciprocity can be realistically 
addressed. Indeed the liberal idea of a mere celebration of cultural diversity is 
naïve because it minimizes the complexity of expressions of value in confl ictual 
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contexts involving multiple negotiations around demands for recognition. 
Yet it is precisely those confl ictual contexts around both values and resources 
that make the practice of a norm-based, universal citizenship relevant for all 
concerned. Any notion of cosmopolitan, or universal citizenship must therefore 
include a more realistic relationship to the potentially divisive effects of both 
cultural diversity and confl icts of values, especially if and when they overlap 
with confl ict over resources. 
Amartya Sen writes in his recent book, The Argumentative Indian, that 
“a broader understanding of democracy – going well beyond the freedom of 
elections and ballots – has emerged powerfully.”(11) For Amartya Sen, “public 
argument”, or “public reasoning” is essential, since “in addition to the fact that 
open discussions on important public decisions can vastly enhance information 
about society and about our priorities, they can also provide the opportunity for 
revising the chosen priorities in response to public discussion.”(12) Sen’s argument 
is inspired by the Indian tradition of public argumentation, where “public 
discussion applies not merely to the public expression of values, but also to 
the interactive formation of values.”(13) Seyla Benhabib, another theorist in the 
fi eld of democratic communicational ethics,(14) argues equally powerfully for the 
constructive practice of discursive citizenship within a pluralist context. Indeed 
Benhabib’s argument innovates within the transcendental tradition of discursive 
ethics, in acknowledging the historical and cultural dimension of the citizens 
which she factors into her analysis. Benhabib refers to the potential participants 
of moral conversations within the free space of democracies not as abstract, 
isolated entities, but as situated “in different communities of conversation,” and 
constituted by “the intersecting axes of interests, projects, and life situations.”(15) 
Perhaps unwittingly invoking the democratic virtue of solidarity, and invoking 
a form of civic compassion, she describes the individual as essentially “an 
embodied, fi nite, suffering and emotive being”, and refers to the “development 
of the moral person out of a network of dependencies.”(16) 
The advantage of this discursive model of citizenship is that it humanizes 
an otherwise unrealistic model of deliberative ethics in which only highly 
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competent subjects can participate, as in the Enlightenment model of discursive 
ethics on which European theorists such as Jürgen Habermas often rely. 
Benhabib in my view is thus correct in pointing out that culture is a historical 
product which is in constant fl ux and the result of complex interactions with 
other cultures. I would also agree with her contention that while cultural identity 
potentially fragments, it also enriches the abstract democratic individual by 
recognizing the multiple origins of the self and the multi-layered nature of 
democratic existence. Benhabib recognizes, correctly in my view, that culture is 
not an abstract entity but is continually redefi ned collectively through citizens 
who are claiming their democratic rights. Finally, Benhabib’s contention that 
discursive ethics constitute a “pragmatic imperative to understand each other 
and to enter into a cross-cultural dialogue”(17) is promising. Indeed this expresses 
a view of virtuous and even compassionate citizenship in which citizens actively 
display their “capacity for representative thinking and exercise of contextual 
judgment, by actually listening to all involved or by representing to [themselves] 
imaginatively the many perspectives of those involved.”(18) However, Benhabib’s 
idea of discursive democratic ethics remains idealistic. Her idea of a moral 
conversation is regulated by dutiful citizens who actively participate in global 
dialogues on common ethical norms, without encountering any confl ict. 
Benhabib thus rather optimistically argues for “a pluralistically enlightened 
ethical universalism on a global scale.”(19) 
In pluralist democracies, citizens learn to relate to their own internal 
moral confl icts as they emerge from their encounter with difference. Citizens 
need compassionate skills for the establishment of reconciliation processes in 
the context of radical difference. This confrontational experience necessarily 
constitutes a new moment in the conception of the requirement of citizens 
to engage with difference. Deliberative ethics can be construed not only as 
a pragmatic imperative, but as a practical antidote to violence, when the 
requirement for the engagement in rational discourse and moral dialogue about 
contested values is supplemented with the intention to fi nd common ground. 
Processes of confl ict resolution in this way provide a substantive alternative to 
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isolation and confrontational postures between clearly defi ned identities. Such 
pragmatic skills are grounded in the ethical requirement to resolve confl ict, 
fi nd common ground, and achieve peace, yet they go beyond transcendental 
accounts of rationality and moral conversations in theoretical accounts of the 
confrontation with cultural differences. They recognize that confl ict is not just 
an inevitable, but also a vital part of the life of pluralist democracies as well as 
the condition for their ongoing renewal. 
In an interdependent world, we are all engaged in processes of interpretation 
of different cultures, traditions, systems of knowledge, social modes of being, 
and ways of life – these are the cultural hermeneutics to which Benhabib 
refers. I would further argue that the universal capacity of individuals to claim 
their political, social, economic and even cultural rights, rather than merely 
transcending cultural difference, or naively celebrating it, empowers members of 
communities to question and negotiate the more constraining aspects of culture, 
thus reconnecting them to broader issues of social justice and uniting them on 
different grounds. By accepting differing views about cultural heritage, and 
making critical discussion about cultural heritage public, confl ict is recognized 
as originating in contested interpretations of culture, and the impediment 
that culture sometimes poses to the quest for both justice and consensus is 
recognized. Cultural and social hermeneutics are the foundation of a civic 
consciousness which understands the role of confl ict, yet also acknowledges 
the need to move towards the synthesis of identities. This type of hermeneutics 
also enshrines the democratic requirement for all to actively participate in public 
processes of confl ict resolution around inherited values, their interpretation, and 
their application to everyday problems. 
III. European citizenship
The European Community was originally conceived after the second World 
War as an economic path to peaceful integration. Today, division and confl ict in 
Europe often stem from the complex consequences of economic development 
and globalisation, for example in the structural inequalities induced by migration 
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fl ows and their generational consequences. What can we learn from the 
regional conception of citizenship to further develop the normative component 
of universal citizenship? Etienne Balibar, a French political philosopher, 
argues for a view of European citizenship which challenges the association of 
citizenship with national belonging, and integrates it instead to a post-national 
civic framework. Balibar points out the diffi culties of creating a European 
citizenship, as democratic citizenship in Europe is still very much tied to an 
ideological heritage which sees in citizenship the expression par excellence 
of a nationalist and ethnic conception of political identity. In contrast, Balibar 
suggests the democratization of Europe should promote a new form of political 
consciousness and social solidarity which primarily relies on the recognition 
of international human rights and refugee law. In other words, for a European 
citizenship to exist, a unifi ed normative conception of the European people 
based on the collective defence of human rights must underpin it. A regional 
model of normative citizenship is specifi cally designed to implement principles 
of social justice based on the universal moral imperative of human rights. This 
must include the recognition of the essential interdependence between civil and 
political rights on the one hand, and economic and social rights, on the other. 
Such a conception of citizenship requires that a core component of European 
citizenship be the universal applicability – including to asylum seekers and 
migrants – of principles of human rights and social justice, in return for the 
recognition of the rights and entitlements of established Europeans.(20)
To underscore his argument, Balibar elaborates on the notion of pluralism, 
arguing that the recognition of pluralism and diversity paradoxically calls 
for the restoration of a new ethical imperative within political and economic 
development.(21) In this view, pluralist ethics must be revised from a perspective 
which prioritizes the quest for peace through the reduction of violence and 
the elaboration of complex norms of civility to counteract the politics of 
identity. For Balibar as for Benhabib, identity is not a product, or a package, 
but an ambiguous process of multiple identifi cations. However Balibar, unlike 
Benhabib, is of the opinion that some form of violence always accompanies the 
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constitution of identity in a context of radical difference. Balibar thus readily 
acknowledges the violence of identities, which Benhabib idealistically fails to 
do. Balibar’s corresponding view of civil society is best encapsulated by his 
notion of civility, which, as in Linklater’s post-Marxist interpretation of “moral 
development”, is elaborated from a careful rereading of Marxist writings.(22) 
This conception stems from the acknowledgement of the new shapes of confl ict 
structured through complex and inevitable processes of globalisation such as 
migration. Civility addresses the new constraints placed on the pursuit of human 
rights by renewed confl icts of identity and values leading to irrational violence, 
as “a way of characterizing the politics which takes as its object the very 
violence of identities.”(23) Civility, for Balibar, is simply the establishment of a 
principle of radical non-violence within a pluralist context.
Civility is similar to other classical political virtues such as tolerance or 
harmony. However, it specifi cally innovates within the contemporary context of 
alleged clashes of values and ways of life. Two crucial components of civility 
emerge for the purpose of a normative conception of a universal citizenship 
for peace. First, the concept of civility places limits on the internal excesses 
that emerge from the politics of both autonomy and identity. If identity has 
fragmented social bonds of solidarity, the aim of civility is to unify under a 
common purpose and social project. Thus, civility is best expressed in the 
affi rmation of the importance of international law and standard setting for 
the expression of areas of common interest for humanity. Secondly, and most 
importantly, the primary goal of civility is to delegitimize violence. Civility in 
this way extends the mere expression of a virtue to become a radical ethical 
principle. It asserts the civic responsibility of individuals and of groups to limit 
the violent consequences of the assertion of identity. Thirdly, civility asserts 
the historicity of violence against its universality or inevitability. The aim of 
public debate on human rights norms  is thus to “create[s] a public space … 
and enable[s] violence itself to be historicised.”(24) To summarize, while identity 
is reinforced through exclusion, civility affi rms the fundamental universal 
principles of encounter and inclusion, establishing a new type of civil space 
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which acknowledges, historicizes, and delegitimizes violence. 
 Ultimately, civility also calls for an ethical response to some of the 
consequences of political action, by enshrining a universal political responsibility 
to prevent violence. Indeed, civility must prioritize the mediation rather than 
the assertion of identities and confl icting values. Civility as radical nonviolence 
thus successfully combines with communicational ethics and cosmopolitan 
belonging to generate a universal understanding of citizenship. This in turn can 
be integrated into a behavioral model of individual and communal action, for 
the benefi t of a variety of peace making, confl ict prevention, and peace building 
processes.(25) As a set of ethical standards, the public norms of civility may be 
integrated into various public, political and institutional discourses and practices 
in which both government and civil society agencies operate and coordinate 
their efforts for peace. Furthermore, as a philosophical model for the mediation 
between historically conceived identities, civility provides an invaluable 
philosophical and practical model for the pre-emption of the escalation of 
confl ict, notably by affi rming the priority of the more lengthy, and profoundly 
historical processes of confl ict resolution, over the recourse to violence. The 
expression of civility through a practical concept of global citizenship and 
responsibility can also be applied to peace-making processes such as diplomacy, 
treaty making and confl ict mediation. Finally, civility may also form the basic 
principles of peace restoration/peace enforcement processes. Indeed, in a 
post-colonial environment in which identities play an important role, critical 
awareness of both the power and historicity of identity is crucial. 
Conclusion
The idea of global or universal citizenship can be further enhanced by 
integrating and building on some crucial elements of various models of 
democratic civic virtues. The different pragmatic and moral imperatives of 
citizenship discussed above all concur in the requirement for an ongoing 
renewal of a public sphere constituted by public norms. I have further argued 
that the prioritizing of civic norms and virtues for the resolution of confl ict 
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and the promotion of sustainable concepts of peace is needed to supplement 
a contemporary understanding of democratic citizenship. To be truly oriented 
towards comprehensive peace-building, universal norms must initially be 
developed within a context that acknowledges two types of pluralism, namely, 
(1) the pluralism of cultures, histories, civilizations, and values, and (2) the 
pluralism of socio-economic conditions, including social inequalities. The goal 
of universal citizenship thus becomes the achievement of a multi-dimensional 
or “positive” socio-economic, cultural and political view of peace expressed in 
the recognition of the importance of international normative frameworks such as 
international law, diplomacy, and cooperation, as well as the democratic role of 
civil society in its demands for peace, development and justice. 
Correspondingly, a common public and civic space must be conceived as a 
space of responsibility, humility, rationality, and moderation in order to achieve 
the following goals of sustainable peace.  These goals are 1) to continue to 
delegitimize violence in all its forms, including state based, 2) to continue to 
assume, assert and practice the idea that shared norms on a planetary scale for 
a positive concept of peace is possible, 3) to actively pursue public dialogue 
for the preservation and the expansion of the consensus on universal norms 
including notions of human rights, human development and human security, 
and 4) to further develop the notion of collective responsibility to protect those 
who are the most vulnerable within the international community.(26) These norms 
continue to be debated by an enlightened and empowered citizenry which 
recognizes its rights to freedom, justice and equality, but also believes in its 
responsibility to defend, uphold and practice those values. A model of universal 
citizenship can become the underlying framework for all national citizenships 
and the means to the peaceful integration of nations, cultures and civilizations 
in a truly global ethical society articulated around the priority of peace, human 
security and human rights.
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Contested Models of Democratic Virtues:
Towards Global Norms for Universal Citizenship?
<Summary>
Geneviève Souillac
This article explores the relationship between democratic governance and 
global governance from the point of view of universal citizenship. Three models 
of democratic citizenship and their associated understandings of democratic 
virtues are discussed with a view to formulating an approach to citizenship 
which incorporates the requirements of confl ict resolution, non violence, and 
peace building. Notions of civil society, pluralism, dialogue and responsibility 
are analyzed in the three models of (1) cosmopolitan citizenship, (2) discursive 
citizenship, and (3) regional citizenship. The cosmopolitan model of citizenship 
assumes the possibility of an international ethical society composed not only 
of states but also of a participatory civil society. The discursive model of 
citizenship presupposes a civil society in which decision-making and policy-
making procedures are derived from public dialogue and moral deliberation. The 
regional model of citizenship expresses the virtue of collective responsibility 
and the quest for consensus on legal, political and ethical norms, such as the 
ones contained in international human rights law, international refugee law, 
and international humanitarian law. The three models of citizenship, with their 
respective accounts of democratic virtues and of civil society, provide the basis 
from which to formulate a model of universal citizenship with a human-centered 
approach to political belonging and participation.  
The article argues that a normative model of citizenship with roots in 
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democratic wisdom can make a signifi cant contribution to the fi eld of peace and 
confl ict studies. Contemporary democratic theories of citizenship elucidate the 
potential connections between the practice of citizenship, peace-building and 
confl ict resolution. Conversely, the prioritization of civic norms and virtues for 
the resolution of confl ict and the promotion of sustainable concepts of peace 
supplements a contemporary understanding of democratic citizenship. The goal 
of universal citizenship is the achievement of a multi-dimensional or “positive” 
socio-economic, cultural and political view of peace expressed in the recognition 
of the importance of international normative frameworks such as international 
law, diplomacy, and cooperation, as well as of civil society and its demands for 
peace, development, and justice. The moral imperatives of citizenship discussed 
in this article concur in the requirement for an ongoing renewal of a public 
sphere constituted by public norms. To be truly oriented towards comprehensive 
peace-building however, universal norms must be developed within a context 
that acknowledges both the pluralism of cultures, histories, civilizations, 
and values, and the pluralism of socio-economic conditions, including social 
inequalities. Most importantly, the article suggests that a democratically 
conceived public and civic space must aim towards the achievement of the 
following goals of sustainable peace: 1) to continue to delegitimize violence in 
all its forms, including state based, 2) to continue to assume, assert and practice 
the idea that shared norms on a planetary scale for a positive concept of peace 
is possible, 3) to actively pursue public dialogue for the preservation and the 
expansion of the consensus on universal norms including notions of human 
rights, human development and human security, and 4) to further develop the 
notion of collective responsibility to protect those who are the most vulnerable 
within the international community. In this way, universal citizenship  becomes 
the underlying framework for all national citizenships and the means to the 
peaceful integration of nations, cultures and civilizations in a truly global ethical 
society articulated around the priority of human security and human rights.
